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Over 90 per cent of internet searches go through Google; in 
social media Facebook’s European market share is over 70 per 
cent; and almost half of Germany’s online commerce now 
takes place via Amazon.1 A few companies dominate broad 
swathes of internet commerce. This tendency towards mo-
nopolisation not only endangers competition, but in the me-
dium term weakens business’s innovative capacity. Studies 
also show that market concentration goes hand in hand with 
inequality or income and wealth (Ferschli et al. 2019; Autor et 
al. 2019).
European policymakers are largely at one on the need for 
regulatory action. They remain divided on how the problem 
can best be addressed, however. Most proposals rely on tra-
ditional (»legacy«) competition-law instruments or even the 
break-up of the tech giants. But can the regulatory challenges 
of the digital age be solved solely with existing cartel law or 
do we need new, innovative policy solutions?
A still fairly recent proposal that is increasingly attracting 
attention in Europe is the data sharing obligation. The SPD 
first floated this idea in February 2019 within the framework 
of an initiative for a »data-for-all law« (SPD 2019a) and sub-
stantiated the proposal in a resolution at the party congress 
later that year (SPD 2019b). There is similar thinking at EU 
level (Government of the Netherlands 2019). The data sharing 
obligation is based on the assumption that data or access to 
data is key to solving the problem. Companies that dominate 
a data-driven market should be obliged to share their data – 
with other firms active in the same market, but also with 
public and civil society organisations. According to advocates, 
this would give rise to fairer competition on the digital market, 
which in turn will spur innovation. The data sharing obligation 
could also breathe life into the idea of data as a »common 
good«, which is both produced and used by society. 
In a number of respects, the data sharing obligation takes 
policymakers into new legislative territory. Numerous ques-
tions arise, accordingly. Under what conditions will a company 
have to share its data? Who will have access to this data? 
Which data will have to be shared and how can it be shared 
without infringing other legal provisions, in particular data 
1 For statistics on Google and Facebook for December 2019, see Stat-
counter (no date a) and Statcounter (no date b); for Amazon’s market 
share for 2017 see University of St. Gallen (no date).
protection? And last but not least, what technical and institu-
tional infrastructure are required for data sharing? 
To clarify these issues we asked Jens Prüfer, Associate Profes-
sor for Economics at the University of Tillburg and one of the 
prime movers of the data sharing obligation, to develop 
some recommendations on how the idea can be implement-
ed in legislative practice. Also incorporated in this process are 
the results of an expert discussion held in summer 2019 with-
in the framework of which we discussed implementation op-
tions with representatives from business, politics and civil so-
ciety. We would like to thank all participants for their 
contributions.
We hope that the present study can help to clarify the key 
questions pertaining to the data sharing obligation and make 
it more tangible for policymakers and business.
Foreword
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We2are drowning in data. Around 90 per cent of the world’s 
data today was created in the past two years.3 Most of it is 
unstructured text, images and videos, which is hard to cate-
gorize, let alone understand, for human beings.4 There are 
sensor data in (self-driving) cars, smart home and office 
equipment, social media data, mobile data, data on internet 
and browsing behaviour, or digital camera images, to name 
just a few. This explosion of data is accompanied by tremen-
dous progress in data science methods, which can make 
sense of all the available information. These methods are 
fuelled by artificial intelligence (AI). The McKinsey Global In-
stitute recently projected that the adoption of AI by firms may 
follow an S-curve pattern: a slow start given the investment 
associated with learning and deploying the technology, and 
then acceleration driven by competition and improvements in 
complementary capabilities (Bughin et al., 2018). At the mac-
ro level, they expect that AI could potentially deliver addition-
al economic output of around U$13 trillion by 2030, boosting 
global GDP by about 1.2 per cent a year. 
Realizing these potential gains, however, requires a couple of 
decisions we need to take. At their core is the insight that the 
surge of big data and AI we are witnessing is not exogenous: 
it is the consequence of human actions that are driving tech-
nological progress. And these actions, taken mainly by busi-
nesses in the United States, are the outcome of an economic 
and legal system that enables and incentivizes entrepreneurs 
to innovate. Hence, what we need to ask, if we want to un-
derstand how to let as many people as possible enjoy the 
benefits of technological progress, is the following: 
How can we shape innovation-support institutions such that 
the incentives to invest in innovation are high and ensure that 
the benefits that stem from mere by-products of innovation 
are distributed widely, for many to enjoy? 
2 Jens Prüfer: I am grateful to my colleagues at the Tilburg Law and Eco- 
nomics Center (TILEC) for valuable feedback, especiallyFrancisco Costa- 
Cabral, Inge Graef, Tobias Klein, Madina Kurmangaliyeva, Giorgio Monti 
and Patricia Prüfer. Constructive comments by Stefanie Moser, Robert 






Such successful institutional design would avoid extreme in-
equality of opportunities and outcomes and, hence, contrib-
ute to social cohesion and welfare in these times of great 
technological disruption. 
1.1  WHAT IS NOT PROPOSED HERE 
It has been speculated that the mandatory »sharing of data« 
could solve many problems of our »datafied« society.5 How-
ever, such general claims leave many questions unanswered 
and lack a theory of harm. At this level of generality, the idea 
is terrifying to many companies, who fear that their business 
secrets would be exposed to competitors with better-devel-
oped analytic capabilities (or that those secrets could be in-
ferred from mandatorily shared datasets related to their tech-
nologies and operations). It is also threatening to many 
consumer and privacy protectors, who fear that citizens’ per-
sonal data, together with individual identifiers, would be pub-
licly exposed and hence enable large-scale privacy intrusion, 
from both legal and illegal actors. 
While a general, unrestricted data-sharing obligation may 
have tremendous negative consequences, which are not the 
subject of this essay, I will explain when and why a certain 
kind of data sharing would have positive consequences in 
specific sectors. Summarizing those positive consequences, 
given today’s knowledge, the specific kind of data sharing 
discussed below seems the best solution available to tackle 
a genuine problem on data-driven markets: monopolization 
with the consequence of diminished incentives to innovate 
both for dominant firms and their (potential) competitors. If it 
is not implemented (the sooner the better), the total benefits 
of datafication (= big data + AI) described above will be re-
duced and enjoyed ever more unequally, with all the dismal 
social, political and economic effects of excessive inequality.6 
5 SPD (2019), Digitaler Fortschritt durch ein Daten-für-Alle-Gesetz, 
https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Sonstiges/Daten_fuer_Alle.pdf
6  Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge (2018) provide data on and analysis 
of this inequality. 
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1.2  THE PROBLEM: THE NATURAL TEN- 
DENCY OF DATA-DRIVEN MARKETS TO-
WARDS MONOPOLIZATION 
In the past two decades, we have witnessed the unprece-
dented, indeed stellar rise of a few companies that offer 
products and services that billions of users want to use and 
which have changed our lives in many respects. They have 
been rewarded with equally unprecedented profits and 
stock-market valuations, sometimes – temporarily – exceed-
ing U$1 trillion for the top firms, reflecting shareholders’ ex-
pectations about their future profitability. Such expectations 
are not unfounded. 
These »superstar firms« (Autor et al. 2017) have been remark-
ably successful in identifying users’ needs, in developing de-
vices and services that satisfy demand – and in understand-
ing and exploiting fundamental economic mechanisms that 
make these markets so special. What distinguishes the super-
star firms from others is that they understood early,7 first, that 
data are the key ingredient boosting the value of their servic-
es for users and second, accompanying this insight, the eco-
nomics of data-driven markets. 
In a data-driven market, the interaction between a service 
provider and a user is administered electronically such that it 
is possible to store users’ choices (for example, clicking behav-
iour) and characteristics (for example, IP address, language 
preferences, or location) with very little effort. Examples in-
clude search engines, digital maps, platform markets (for ex-
ample, for hotels, transportation, dating, music/video-on-de-
mand); probably also smart meters, self-driving vehicles and 
various other markets. Due to progress in computer science 
and in data analytics, analysing »big data« and making pre-
dictions about individuals’ or groups’ future behaviour has 
become much more effective in the past few years.8 
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) call the information about us-
ers’ preferences and/or characteristics user information.9 They 
show in a dynamic economic model that, in data-driven mar-
kets, user information is a key input in the innovation process: 
via feedback effects (»data-driven indirect network effects«), 
user information leads to market tipping (monopolization; see 
7 In fact, (only) since 2001 has Google made use of the data created by 
logging users' clicking behaviour in so- called »search logs« (Zuboff 2016). 
Before that, Google's original page rank algorithm, as described in Page et 
al. (1999), let the rank of a website be determined only by the structure of 
hyperlinks on the world wide web, not by user information.
8 See, for example, Le Cun et al. (2015). A very accessible introduction 
to the economic consequences of better prediction is Agrawal et al. (2018).
9 To be clear: user information refers to all information that a service 
provider gains about an individual user or a group of users by logging in-
teractions with that user. It excludes data about the quality of machines 
(for example, the workings of certain technologies within a car) but in-
cludes data about the people in the car (for example, the reaction speed 
of the driver or the choices of people on the backseats regarding videos 
shown by the in-car entertainment system). Data generated by CCTV 
cameras about the number and walking speed of pedestrians or the iden-
tity of those pedestrians, generated by an accompanying face recognition 
system, are also regarded as user information; but information about how 
long the CCTV camera can run after an energy fallout is not. Hence, the 
concept of user information is much broader than the data sometimes re-
quested by websites for registration, for example, name, (e-mail) address 
or phone number.
Box 1). The problem is that such a tipped market with one 
dominant firm and, potentially, a few very small niche players, 
is characterized by low incentives to innovate, both for the 
dominant firm and for (potential) challengers. 
This tendency of data-driven markets to tip is that the smaller 
firms, even if they are equipped with a superior idea/produc-
tion technology, face higher marginal costs of innovation be-
cause they lack access to the large pile of user information 
that the dominant firm has access to due to its significantly 
larger user base. Consequently, if a smaller firm were to heav-
ily invest in innovation and roll out its high-quality product, 
the dominant firm could imitate it quickly ---at lower cost of 
innovation ---and regain its quality lead. The smaller firm 
would find itself once again in the runners-up spot, which 
entails few users and low revenues, but it would still have to 
pay the large costs involved in attempting a leap in innova-
tion. Foreseeing this situation, no rational entrepreneur would 
invest in innovation in a smaller firm. In turn, because the 
dominant firm knows about the disincentive to innovate 
among its would-be competitors, it is protected by its large 
(and constantly renewed) stream of user information and can 
remain content with a lower level of innovation, too.
Box 1 
MARKET TIPPING 
In principle, every market can be dominated by a single 
firm. In economic theory, we usually speak of a mono- 
poly even if the »monopolist« does not have 100 per- 
cent market share but is only very dominant and the 
other firms in the market cannot affect the price that is 
accepted by consumers very much. If a market is mo- 
ving towards monopoly, we speak of market tipping: 
the market share of the dominant firm is continuously 
increasing, while other firms’ market shares are dropping. 
Market tipping can have various reasons, including 
static or dynamic economies of scale or various network 
effects: direct network effects (a user’s utility increases  
in proportion to the number of other users, for example, 
in telecommunications) and indirect network effects  
(a user’s utility increases in proportion to the number of 
users on the other side of a market, for example, dating 
platforms) have been studied. Data-driven indirect 
network effects, however, are a novel phenomenon 
driven by big data (for example, for search engines):  
a user’s utility is not directly affected by other users but 
the amount of other users increases the provider’s 
stock of user information, which in turn decreases the 
cost of innovation for the provider. All else being equal, 
this provides the dominant company with an initial lead 
in innovation, which – again – increases its access to 
user information and so grows into a self-reinforcing 
competitive edge (and finally market tipping). Once a 
market is tipped, however, the incentive to innovate 
decreases sharply for all market players (including the 
dominant firm).
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Such relatively low innovation rates, both by the dominant 
firm and by (would-be) competitors, compared with a situa-
tion with lively competition, constitute the theory of harm in 
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017). Moreover, they introduced the 
idea of connected markets: providers can connect markets if 
the user information they have gained is also valuable in an-
other market. For instance, some search engine queries are 
related to geographic information. These data are also valua-
ble when providing a customized map service. The authors 
showed that if the market entry costs in a »traditional« market 
are not too high, a firm that finds a »data-driven« business 
model can dominate any market in the long term. Relevant 
user information on its home market is a great facilitator of 
this process, which can occur repeatedly, generating a domi-
no effect. 
The third contribution of that paper was, based on the earlier 
idea of Argenton and Prüfer (2012), to study the consequenc-
es of a regulatory requirement for dominant firms in da-
ta-driven markets to share their (anonymized) data on user 
preferences and characteristics with each other. Prüfer and 
Schottmüller showed that, even in a dynamic model where 
competitors know that their innovation investments today 
affect their market shares and hence their innovation costs 
tomorrow, such policy intervention could mitigate market tip-
ping and would have positive net effects on innovation and 
welfare if data-driven indirect network effects are sufficiently 
strong in that market. 
Now, before addressing critical issues surrounding the practi-
cal implementation of the mandatory data-sharing proposal 
in Section 3, I will first sketch why several alternative propos-
als mentioned in previous discussions are not well suited to 
tackle the tipping problem on data-driven markets.
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tion algorithms be opened up so that competitors can take a 
look and learn from the dominant firm. This may be an effec-
tive strategy in a static economy without a future, but it is 
doomed to fail in a dynamic high-tech industry that competes 
by innovation. The reason is that innovating by improving al-
gorithms is costly at the margin; that is, every additional »unit 
of innovation effort« – for example, hiring another researcher 
– has to be paid for. Consequently, if a firm (the dominant one 
or another one) knows that the fruits of its innovation invest-
ments today may be taken away tomorrow because it may 
be forced to share its insights concerning its algorithms with 
its competitors, its propensity to spend on innovation today 
will decrease steeply.11 Because this effect counteracts the 
goal of increasing innovation levels in data-driven markets, 
the forced opening of algorithms would be an inappropriate 
policy measure. 
2.3  DATA PORTABILITY 
Article 20 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GD-
PR) provides users of a service with the right to ask their pro-
vider for their personal data and to transfer it to another 
(competing) provider (data portability). Here I will not discuss 
the pros and cons of this legal provision (see Graef et al., 2018, 
for a competent treatment), but only point to the fact that 
data portability cannot solve the problem of market tipping 
on data-driven markets. The reasons are threefold. 
First, even if a user requests their personal data from a pro-
vider, the provider is not obliged to delete the data and, 
hence, a dominant firm does not lose data even if all its users 
were to make use of their right to data portability. Second, 
the GDPR does not extend to insights that are derived, often 
by using AI, from combining the personal data sets of millions 
of users. If, via data portability requests, a competitor gets 
hold of only a fraction of individual sets of personal data, 
compared with the dominant firm, the dominant firm would 
still be able to learn more, for example, about which product 
features are especially sought after by which type of users. 
This would make the value of one additional dataset for a 
competing firm smaller than for the dominant firm. Finally and 
most importantly, users’ data portability requests are made 
11 This is the core problem of every (expected) expropriation. If property 
rights are insecure, incentives to invest in the improvement or mainte-
nance of resources are shallow.
2
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO TACKLE  
TIPPING ON DATA-DRIVEN MARKETS
Because the market power of dominant firms on various da-
ta-intensive markets has grown over the past few years, reg-
ulators, competition authorities and politicians in many coun-
tries have started to question the roots and consequences of 
this development (see Section 4). Several proposals have 
been made on how to tackle the strong and persistent dom-
inance of big tech firms in such markets. Here, I will briefly 
discuss a few of them. 
2.1  DOMINANT FIRMS SHOULD  
BE BROKEN UP10
The specific market-tipping problem on data-driven markets 
stems from the often inseparable connection because offer-
ing a service/selling a good and logging the user’s choices 
and characteristics during their consumption/purchase. Con-
sequently, if a dominant firm on such a market was forced to 
divest parts of its business, there would still be one part left 
that continues to run the core service, to interact with users, 
and thereby to amass exclusive user information – and hence 
to tip the market in the long run. The same would even be 
true if the firm was mandated to split its core service, for ex-
ample, running a search engine, into two identical and com-
peting parts: if the sharing of algorithms, user information, 
and other resources occurred only once, only one part could 
occupy the same web spot (URL) as the previous monopolist, 
which would give it a slight head start. Then, due to the na-
ture of machine-learning (self-adapting) algorithms and the 
fact that users can interact only with one provider for a given 
service/purchase at a given point of time (for example, to get 
one search query answered), the part with the head start 
would get more user information than the other. Instantane-
ously, the market-tipping dynamic, as analysed in Prüfer and 
Schottmüller (2017), would start again. The problem would 
not be solved. 
2.2  MANDATORY SHARING OF/OPEN AC-
CESS TO ALGORITHMS
If a complete breakup of dominant firms is unlikely to happen, 
one may be tempted to require that their matching or predic-
10 See, for example, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/08/politics/
elizabeth-warren-amazon-google facebook/index.html
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in parallel and for each individual separately. Invoking one’s 
data portability right comes at positive marginal cost because 
each individual user has to contact the provider and request 
the data, verify their identity and then transfer it to a compet-
itor. Given that the value of the personal information of one 
more user is extremely small (if one already has millions of 
users), a user cannot expect that the transfer of their data will 
increase the quality of their new provider in a recognizable 
way. Consequently, it is incentive-compatible for many users 
not to invest the effort into requesting their data. Therefore, 
it can be expected that data portability will remain rather 
toothless to mitigate the tipping of data-driven markets. 
2.4  TAX DATA USE 
Due to the very asymmetric distribution of the gains generat-
ed by dominant firms on several platform markets, many of 
which are driven by data, suggestions have been made to tax 
the use of data. While there may be good reasons for such a 
policy from a distributional-justice perspective, such a policy 
would not tackle the main problem on data-driven markets, 
market tipping. The reason is that, on one hand, generating 
and using data can be efficient as it allows service providers 
to match users better with information or services they like. 
Reducing this benefit by increasing the price of generating or 
transferring data, via taxation, would decrease the incentives 
to collect and use data and, hence, decrease service quality 
as perceived by users/consumers. On the other hand, be-
cause market tipping on data-driven markets is a conse-
quence of competitors’ asymmetric access to key resources, 
most notably user information, and as taxation would not 
affect the relative lead of the dominant firm in accessing user 
information, this policy would be unable to tackle market tip-
ping. 
2.5  COMPETITION LAW TODAY
In many discussions about the law and economics of da-
ta-driven markets, scholars and others assert that today’s 
competition law, most notably Article 102 TFEU, which pro-
hibits the abuse of a dominant position in a market, is suffi-
cient to avoid major problems. In my opinion, existing EU 
competition law falls short of the goal of increasing competi-
tion and innovation. 
Article 102 TFEU is a powerful tool if a dominant firm actual-
ly engaged in conduct that abuses its market power and 
hence leverages it to other products or forecloses markets. It 
can also help to punish uncompetitive behaviour in data-driv-
en markets.12 But competition law works ex post and case-
based: every time a competitor asks a dominant firm to share 
its user information, based on the claim that those data are 
an essential facility to compete in this market, a new case 
would be established and have to be decided by the relevant 
competition authority and, potentially, appeals courts. As 
12 See the Google Shopping case for a good example: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_
code=1_39740 
shown by Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017), however, market 
tipping occurs in data-driven markets even if the dominant 
firm’s conduct is flawless as it depends on data-driven indirect 
network effects, which are an unavoidable (and potentially 
very efficient) economic characteristic of such markets. More-
over, if a market is found to be data-driven, tipping can be 
predicted. Abusive behaviour by a dominant firm is not nec-
essary to tip the market or to discourage competitors from 
innovating heavily. Therefore, what is needed is the option to 
intervene in such markets ex ante, that is, before the market 
has tipped and the dominant firm can be accused of abusing 
its position (which perhaps it has not). Moreover, in order to 
avoid the cumbersome and lengthy process of repetitive legal 
cases, a quicker and more flexible tool that allows competi-
tion authorities to intervene in markets without invoking the 
essential facilities doctrine is needed, a tool that is akin to 
regulation once a market has been identified as data-driven.13
13 The Dutch Ministry of the Economy recently published an open letter 
proposing adjustments of competition law. They include the option for 
mandatory data sharing in specific industries, ex ante interventions, and 
several other interesting ideas. In English: https://www.government.nl/lat-
est/news/2019/05/27/dutch-government change-competition-policy-and-
merger-thresholds-for-better-digital-economy. In German: https://www.
government.nl/documents/letters/2019/05/23/zukunftstauglichkeit-des-
wettbewerbsinstrumentariums-in-bezug-auf-onlineplattformen 
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The contributions of Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) are theo-
retical. They suggest explanations of the empirical patterns 
we observe, but they are short on giving detailed hints about 
how their ideas, especially the data-sharing policy proposal, 
could be translated into practice. They declare that: On a da-
ta-driven market, due to indirect network effects driven by 
machine-generated data about user preferences or charac-
teristics, marginal costs of innovating are decreasing in de-
mand. The policy proposal is adapted from Argenton and 
Prüfer (2012) and stated as follows: On a data-driven market, 
all user information should be anonymized and shared by all 
competitors with each other. 
In practice – and hence for the purpose of this study – the 
following questions need to be answered: 
1 How to identify a data-driven market empirically? 
2  Precisely what information should be shared on which 
market? 
3 How can user information be anonymized and how can 
re-identification of individuals (technically or legally) be 
avoided? 
4  Who exactly should share data? 
5 Who should have the right to get access to the shared 
data? At what price? 
6  How should data sharing be organized? What is the 
optimal governance structure? 
I will address these questions in order of appearance. 
3.1  HOW CAN A DATA-DRIVEN MARKET 
BE IDENTIFIED EMPIRICALLY? 
One of the most challenging tasks when designing a manda-
tory data-sharing law is the delineation of its domain of ap-
plicability. To start with, there must be some kind of test that 
determines whether an industry is data-driven or not. This is 
important because Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) showed 
that the net welfare effects of mandatory data sharing are 
unambiguously positive only if data-driven indirect network 
effects are sufficiently pronounced, that is, if user information 
decreases the marginal cost of innovation substantially and 
not only modestly. In the latter case, data sharing can still be 
positive but, due to the resulting multiplication of innovation 
costs when several providers compete actively with each oth-
er, the net welfare effect is unclear. 
Such a test ideally produces an index of data-drivenness, It is 
necessarily applied at the industry level. Its result would be 
that, for instance, »industry A has a high degree of da-
ta-drivenness and therefore mandatory data sharing is war-
ranted«, whereas »industry B is only mildly data-driven such 
that there should be no mandatory data sharing«. 
Any exercise at industry level requires some kind of market 
definition. As we know from merger regulations, for instance, 
any market definition (or delineation) is cumbersome and 
easy to criticize that increases the transaction costs of the 
entire exercise. Moreover, some people argue that many da-
ta-driven markets overlap (for example, that Google, Face-
book, Microsoft and Apple are competing in the online ad-
vertisement market). Therefore, a reasonable starting point for 
market definition is to take a user/consumer perspective and 
to ask what service that user demands now and which pro-
viders may have an offer that can satisfy the user’s needs. For 
instance, users usually have no specific demand for advertise-
ments, but they can well specify whether they are looking for 
the best match with a general search query (hence the rele-
vant market would be general search engines) or a hotel in 
Berlin (relevant market: overnight stays at hotels in Berlin) or 
the route to that hotel (relevant market: route planners with 
information on the way to Berlin). In none of these cases is 
the relevant market »advertisement«. 
As for the test for data-drivenness, it is important to under-
stand the novel quality of data-driven indirect network ef-
fects, compared with other economic effects. They combine 
the value of more user information on the demand side of a 
market with lower marginal cost of innovation on the supply 
side. Therefore, a test for data-drivenness of a market should 
include (at least) two parts. First, to understand the demand 
side better, we should empirically analyse – for example, by 
administering randomized field experiments within or be-
tween firms from the respective industry – the extent to 
which the artificial interruption of access to user information 
decreases service quality, as perceived by users. One could 
administer user surveys to learn the extent to which the arti-
ficial quality decrease during an experiment was a mere nui-
sance (and dominated by other product characteristics, such 
as service speed or user friendliness) or when it annoyed 
users so much that they reconsidered their choice of service 
provider. 
3
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Second, to understand the supply side, one could develop 
quantitative measures of product quality, such as the speed 
of delivering a service.14
In data-driven markets, the analysis would reveal an endoge-
neity issue: access to more user information increases quality 
measures; higher product/service quality increases demand 
for the service, which, in turn, increases the amount of user 
information even more.15, 16 If such a circle can (not) be em-
pirically identified, the market is (not) data-driven. 
In practice, such tests will be neither easy nor quick. Therefore, 
it is important that, in the long run, the organization that is in 
charge of enforcing the mandatory data-sharing law (for ex-
ample, a new EU-level agency or a new division of DG Comp; 
see Section 3.6) has enough legal, human, and financial re-
sources to administer such tests at the level of many indus-
tries, starting with the prime suspects. 
Complementing this procedure, the idea of turning around 
the burden of proof could be applied, as was promoted in the 
recent Vestager Report for the EU’s DG Competition (Cremer 
et al., 2019). Even if the original proposal is related to cases 
concerning the abuse of a dominant position, the underlying 
logic is straightforward and can inform our current question. 
If, after some pre-testing (see suggestions above), a firm is 
deemed to be dominant in a potentially data-driven market 
and the firm objects to this claim, it would be up to that firm 
to show that it is not dominant. Given that firm’s superior ac-
cess to user information and other characteristics of its prod-
uct, this obligation seems more efficient than the obligation 
on an outsider – for example, a competition authority – to 
prove dominance without access to such information. Box 2 
summarizes these considerations.
14 See He et al. (2015) or Schaefer et al. (2018) for attempts to measure 
the quality of general search engines and its dependence on access to user 
information (in the form of search log data).
15 In »traditional« markets that are not data-driven, higher quality also 
leads to higher demand, ceteris paribus, but higher demand does not 
boost product/service quality, at least not to the extent that investments 
in other aspects of R&D, such as hiring more researchers, could be sub- 
stituted by the gains that come through access to more demand (and user 
information).
16 This concept is related (but not identical) to the test for small but sig-
nificant non-transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ), which is modelled after 
the better-known SSNIP test. See Gebicka and Heinemann (2014:158) for 
details.
3.2  WHAT INFORMATION EXACTLY 
SHOULD BE SHARED ON WHICH MARKET? 
The goal of the policy proposal at hand is to avoid market 
tipping on data-driven markets or, in case a market has al-
ready tipped, to make it contestable again. For that purpose, 
only the sharing of user information is relevant, no other da-
ta.17 These are raw data about users’ choices or characteris-
tics, which can be automatically (and hence at virtually zero 
marginal cost) logged during a user’s interaction with a ser-
vice provider.18 The policy proposal explicitly does not include 
processed data, in which the original service provider/domi-
nant firm already invested effort, for instance for data analyt-
ics (and hence at positive marginal cost). If such data would 
be required to be shared, it might facilitate free-riding of 
smaller competitors and crowd out the dominant firm’s incen-
tives to invest into analytics in the first place (see footnote 12). 
If only raw data are shared, it also incentivizes competitors to 
develop own analytics techniques, which can lead to a plural-
ity of approaches, differentiated products, and, hence, more 
choice for consumers. 
It may be tempting to require also the sharing of other data, 
but such requirements would first warrant a separate theory 
of harm for the case in which they are not shared. In contrast, 
the proposal at hand is strictly designed to mitigate market 
tipping on data-driven markets, which appears to be the 
main problem on such markets. All other issues discussed in 
Section 2, including the potential to abuse a dominant posi-
tion or the possibility to earn huge monopoly profits and have 
them taxed elsewhere, decrease once a market is more com-
petitive. 
Finally, in order to disseminate the effects of data sharing as 
quickly as possible, user information would have to be shared 
on a »continuous« basis, that is, as frequently as technically 
possible.19 
17 Specifically, there is no need to ask anybody to share technical data 
about machines or business processes that go beyond the immediate log-
ging of users‘ choices and characteristics, as known to the respective ser-
vice provider.
18 Like all types of information, user information is non-rival, but excluda-
ble. By lowering the hurdles of excludability via a mandatory data-sharing 
law, its attributes become closer to a public good, the sharing of which is 
efficient. For instance, in the search engine industry, this user information 
would be contained in search log files. Schaefer et al. (2018:5) describe the 
data they retrieved from Yahoo! as »information about the search term, the 
time when the search term was submitted, the computer from which the 
search term originates, the returned list of results, and the clicking behavior 
of the user«.
19 Recently, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and other firms showed 
that sharing of user data is technically and organizationally possible at a 
large scale and automatically. They had announced a new standards initia-
tive called the Data Transfer Project, designed as a new way to move data 
between platforms. See https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/20/17589246/
data-transfer-project-google-facebook-microsoft twitter.
Box 2
POTENTIAL SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS  
TO ESTABLISH THE DATA-DRIVENNESS 
OF A MARKET 
1  market definition (user centric);
2  study the demand side of the market: what drives 
users’ consumption utility? 
3  study the supply side of the market: what drives 
»objective« measures of product quality?
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3.3  HOW TO ANONYMIZE USER INFORMA- 
TION AND HOW TO AVOID RE-IDENTIFICA-
TION OF INDIVIDUALS 
Critics object to the potential trade-off between more com-
petitiveness in the market and less individual privacy if data 
are shared. There are legitimate concerns regarding the data 
protection implications of mandatory data-sharing, which 
have to be addressed. User information that can be linked to 
a specific user qualify as personal data under the GDPR, 
which dictates that such information cannot be shared with-
out a legitimate ground for data processing, such as previous 
consent of users.
Fortunately, privacy-related reservations about data sharing 
can be mitigated by the following considerations: 
Data sharing is unproblematic under the GDPR regulation as 
long as the data shared are anonymized. Anonymization irre-
versibly destroys any way of identifying the data subject, there-
fore anonymized data cannot be re-linked to an individual user.
But even when user information is anonymized, there is a risk 
of »indirect re-identification«, when shared data are matched 
with other data sources. However, technological options exist 
to make the re-identification of a specific individual expensive 
and hence less attractive. Furthermore, in order to mitigate 
the risk of indirect re-identification a data-sharing law could 
be introduced which prohibits the re-identification of individ-
uals from shared data. Thus re-identification would establish 
an illegal act and would be punished.
Under a data sharing regime that effectively prohibits the 
re-identification of data subjects, pseudonymizing data might 
also be considered (see Box 3 below). However, to which ex-
tent this is a viable option has to be carefully examined togeth-
er with data protection authorities and other stakeholders.
Privacy and data security concerns could be further mitigated 
by building data protection into the data sharing governance 
structure (see Section 3.6). Thus, instead of granting organi-
zations direct access to shared data, a trustworthy data inter-
mediary (data trustee) could be established to be responsible 
for guaranteeing the compliance of data sharing with data 
protection rules. The intermediary – for instance, a data pro-
tection authority – could safely pool shared user information 
and ensure the fundamental privacy rights of the users by 
anonymizing the data before sharing it with eligible third parties.
This idea could be taken even further: if there was a data 
trustee, it would be possible to pool all shared user informa-
tion, independent of whether it is personal or non- 
personal data, »behind a curtain«, that is, on a server where 
no human being has access to the data. Instead of sharing 
anonymized data with the organizations eligible under the 
data sharing regulation, those organizations could unleash 
their (differentiated, competing) algorithms to use that data 
pool as training data, without receiving any of the shared 
data themselves. The results, meaning the trained algorithms, 
but not the originally shared user information, would be 
transferred back to the providers who could offer their servic-
es to users on a competitive basis. In May 2019, Finland 
passed legislation on the secondary use of health and social 
data that envisions such an infrastructure and process that 
already comes close to the idea outlined above.
3.4  WHO EXACTLY SHOULD SHARE DATA? 
According to the theoretical proposal of Prüfer and Schott-
müller (2017), all firms in a data-driven market should share 
their user information with others. This seems suboptimal in 
practice, for at least two reasons: (i) data sharing comes at a 
cost and creates an administrative burden; (ii) large, dominant 
firms are more likely to have access to other sources of infor-
mation that complement user information from this market 
and hence have higher marginal benefits from new user in-
formation received (He et al., 2017). As the goal of the policy 
proposal is to establish, as much as possible, a contestable 
level playing-field, this suggests that large firms should share 
more data than small firms. 
Based on this argumentation, the extremes are clear: the 
dominant firm must share all of its user information, whereas 
small firms do not have to share anything. The difficult task is 
to find the optimal boundary beyond which data should be 
shared. In principle, if only the firm serving most users is sub-
ject to a data-sharing obligation and if the second »largest« 
firm is not too far behind – for example, because a market has 
not tipped yet – it may give an unfair advantage to the sec-
ond firm if it does not have to share its own user information. 
Together with the data from the largest firm, it may then have 
more user information in total than the leading one, and over-
take the market leader, increasing its profits significantly, just 
because of an asymmetric data-sharing obligation.18
Therefore, it seems reasonable to introduce a threshold such 
that the largest two or three firms have to share data, as 
these are the contenders for »dominant firm« status. »Size« 
Box 3
ANONYMIZATION VS.  
PSEUDONYMIZATION
Anonymization refers to the process of either encryp- 
ting or removing personally identifiable information 
from datasets, such that the people whom the data 
describe (data subjects) remain anonymous.
Pseudonymization refers to the process of replacing per- 
sonally identifiable information fields by one or more 
artificial identifiers, or pseudonyms. Notably, pseudony- 
mized data can be restored to its original state repla- 
cing the pseudonym by a personal identifier. 
See 
https://www.protegrity.com/blog/pseudonymization-
vs-anonymizationhelp-gdpr for more explanations.
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would be measured by the amount of user information a 
provider has access to, which may be proxied by the number 
of individual interactions with users in most industries. A su-
pervisory authority could collect such information relatively 
easily, at least for providers offering services connected to the 
internet and if providers have a duty to collaborate. An alter-
native to just determining that the »largest« two or three pro-
viders are obliged to share would be to set a market-share 
threshold such that only providers with market shares larger 
than 20 or 30 per cent have to share. 20
These approaches can also be combined: Oblige a firm to 
share its user information if it is among the top three firms in 
the industry and if it serves at least 20 per cent of the indus-
try’s users. 
By way of example, Figure 1, which is taken from Argenton 
and Prüfer (2012), displays the development of market shares 
in the US search engine industry from 2003 to 2010. If the 
rule suggested above had been applied, MSN would have 
had to share its data only in 2004, Yahoo would have had to 
share between 2003 and 2008, and Google would have had 
to share throughout the entire period. No other search engine 
20 Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge (2018) propose to require that all 
firms with a market share above 10 per cent to share data – and to let the 
amount of data to be shared increase with the firm’s market share (pro-
gressive data -sharing mandate). The ingenuity of this idea is that it intro-
duces asymmetric sharing obligations, which should help to fight market 
tipping. The difficulty of the approach, however, is that it requires very pre-
cise estimates of market shares, which also change over time. Moreover, it 
introduces additional enforcement problems if, for instance, one provider 
has to share 40 per cent of its user information. How can it be ensured 
that the 40 per cent of the data that is shared is an unbiased and represen- 
tative sample of that provider’s entire user information? These problems 
are not impossible to solve but seem to be unnecessarily cumbersome. My 
preferred proposal also relies on »market shares« (measured by the amount 
of user information) to determine which firms are obliged to share data. 
Then, however, I propose to let them share all their user information, which 
gets rid of the sample problems
providers would have had to share anything. This asymmetric 
treatment might have avoided market tipping.21
If government agencies compete with private firms – that is, 
if they offer services in areas that are not particularly sensitive 
or security-related – they would be subject to the same shar-
ing obligations.22 The rationale is simply that user information 
is a virtually free by-product of running a service. Giving third 
parties access to those data is efficient as it enables the oth-
ers to innovate and to compete with the incumbent, which 
benefits users. 
21 This example shows the mechanics of the threshold proposal: if a 
market has already tipped, only the dominant firm will have more than a 
20 per cent market share. Hence, only one firm will have to share. If the 
market has not tipped yet, one may ask how the agency in charge of ap-
plying the test may determine whether the market is data-driven in the 
first place. To answer this question, the test for circularity (user information  
≥ quality ≥ users ≥ user information) described in Section 3.1 applies.
22 By the logic of the proposal, this includes applications in which a gov-
ernment agency receives user information through logging interactions 
with citizens electronically but does not have the capacity to offer a valua-
ble service. For instance, if a city government offers citizens with security 
concerns an app to communicate quickly in case of suspicious activities in 
their neighborhood and the received user information might improve that 
service (and the city government is dominant), a competing entrepreneur 
should have the right to obtain that (anonymized) user information, too. 
However, the proposal excludes areas in which the public agency obtains 
information about citizens because they were legally obliged to provide it, 
the information was processed at positive marginal cost and it was not 
obtained as a free by-product of machine-aided interaction between a cit-
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3.5  WHO SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO 
OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE SHARED DATA?  
AT WHAT PRICE?
The guiding principle for answering this question is, yet again, 
the insight that user information is a free by-product of run-
ning a service. Some have claimed that because obtaining 
access to more user information helps to improve the quality 
of one’s service, accumulating it is justified as an end in itself. 
However, the data gathered in this way is certain to be trans-
formed into revenue at some point (for instance, through ad-
vertising or some other sale of access to one’s user groups) 
and protecting those indirect revenues is not a goal of the 
policy proposal at hand because, in the long run, they are 
subject to the main market-tipping dynamics characterized by 
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017). User information therefore 
has the attributes of a public good. It is efficient to share it 
with every party that can (potentially) use it as input into its 
own service and that benefits users in the end. 
Consequently, I propose that user information should be 
shared with every organization that is active in the respective 
industry or that can explain how it would serve users with the 
data. For example, if a start-up wants to develop a service 
offering restaurant evaluations in Germany, then, based on 
the user-centred procedure suggested in Section 3.1, one 
would first have to determine which other firms offer such 
services. This may include specialists (for example, Yelp) but 
also general services (for example, Google Search/Maps). The 
start-up could demand user information from these providers 
(if they are dominant) that is relevant to serving consumers in 
the restaurant-evaluation business in Germany (but it could 
not ask Google for all its other user information!). 
Inspiration can be drawn from the Payment Services Directive 2 
(PSD2) in the financial industry, which entitles third parties, 
with the consent of the account holder, to access payment 
accounts in order to initiate payment transactions via an inter-
net application or to consolidate account information from 
one or more accounts into one application. As such, PSD2 is 
a perfect example of EU regulation to level the playing field 
in the financial sector. Now banks have to accommodate fin-
tech start-ups offering innovative services. The European 
Banking Authority has adopted several Guidelines and Regu-
latory Technical Standards related to implementing access to 
accounts, clarifying the steps banks need to take. Several ini-
tiatives are defining common API standards. 
As on the sharing-obligation side, following the guideline that 
user information has public-good characteristics and was ob-
tained virtually for free, the right to obtain shared user infor-
mation pertains to for-profit, non-profit and public organiza-
tions (state authorities), subject to the above-mentioned 
condition of being able to demonstrate that they can and will 
offer a service to users utilizing the data. This guideline also 
indicates what the appropriate access price to another pro-
vider’s user information should be, namely equal to the shar-
ing provider’s marginal cost of obtaining the user information, 
which is of course zero.23 Note that it is possible that some 
fixed costs may be associated with the storing of user infor-
mation and the supervision of the data-sharing process. 
These costs will be negligible, however, compared with the 
costs of offering a service.24 In any case, in order to make 
market entry and operations as easy as possible for the 
(small) competitors of dominant firms, they should not bear 
these costs. 
3.6  HOW SHOULD DATA SHARING BE  
ORGANIZED? WHAT IS THE OPTIM AL  
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE?  
Turning to the question of the practical delineation of da-
ta-driven markets, addressed in Section 3.1, the issue of the 
optimal governance structure of data sharing is the one that 
needs most thought and research in the future. Here are a 
few initial thoughts that may inspire such analyses. 
In institutional economics, there is a methodology that en-
dogenizes optimal economic governance and corporate gov-
ernance structures that tackle problems such as property 
rights protection, contract enforcement, or collective action.25 
This methodology can also be applied to mandatory data 
sharing in data-driven markets. Key dimensions of relevant 
economic governance institutions are centralized versus de-
centralized enforcement (of data sharing), public versus pri-
vate enforcement, and coercive versus ostracism-based en-
forcement. In line with Section 3.1, it must be underlined that 
the optimal governance structure may differ between indus-
tries, depending on attributes such as the number of players, 
the extent to which a specific industry is national or interna-
tional, the speed of technological progress (which can be 
assumed to be fairly high in all data-driven markets), and the 
homogeneity of interests of senders and receivers of user 
information. 
Section 3.4 proposes that no more than three firms per indus-
try be subject to a data-sharing obligation. Section 3.5, how-
ever, suggests that many organizations might have a valid 
claim to the shared data. Therefore, decentralized data shar-
ing, that is, direct interconnections between senders and re-
23 Note that this result is very different from access pricing in utility in-
dustries such as telecommunications, internet backbone or railways be-
cause there the marginal cost for access to the shared resource (for exam-
ple, utilization of a telecommunications network to offer one’s own ser- 
vices) is positive. Additionally, there are positive fixed costs of operation, 
for example, for maintenance. On data-driven markets, by contrast, there 
are virtually no costs involved in collecting user information (only in run-
ning the main service, for example, internet search or restaurant evalua-
tions). 
24 For instance, US data centers have consumed about 2% of the coun-
try’s entire energy consumption in 2014 (https://www.datacenterknowl-
edge.com/archives/2016/06/27/heres-how-much-energy-all-us-data-
centers-consume). Google’s consumption alone has nearly doubled 
2014-2018 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/788540/energy-consump-
tion-of-google/). These numbers underline the massive scale at which da-
ta-driven markets affect the offline world already now --- and which any 
entrepreneur would have to compete with.
25 See Dixit (2009) and Willamson (2005) for general introductions and 
Prüfer (2013 and 2018) for applications of this methodology to the prob-
lem of a lack of trust in cloud computing.
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ceivers (for example, via APIs) seems impractical. By contrast, 
given that there may be hundreds of sender–receiver rela-
tions per data-driven industry and that all should be able to 
compete on a level playing-field, an intermediary is needed 
between senders and receivers (implementing centralized 
enforcement). This notion is strengthened if one revisits Sec-
tion 3.3, on privacy and recalls that the shared data has to be 
anonymized before it reaches the receiver, for instance, in a 
data pool of user information that is only accessed by algo-
rithms, for training purposes, but never by human beings. This 
could occur in a standardized fashion at the stage of the in-
termediary and not in a decentralized way at the stage of the 
sharing providers. 
Many global high-tech markets can be well governed by pri-
vate organizations, such as industry associations, which have 
a lot of know-how, often involve effective arbitration tribunals 
and can react quickly to changing technological, economic, 
political, or legal circumstances (see Prüfer, 2013, 2018). A 
peculiarity of data-driven markets is, however, that the inter-
ests of the dominant firm and those of all other firms are 
opposed: while all other providers want quick, reliable and 
comprehensive data sharing, the dominant firm wants to 
keep its exclusive advantage in access to user information 
and hence has high incentives to obstruct data sharing. 
Therefore, it seems optimal to commission a public organiza-
tion with access to the coercive enforcement powers of the 
state to manage, or at least closely monitor, data sharing. 
This intermediary organization would be tasked with the 
structure and operation of the data-sharing scheme. It would 
have to cooperate closely with the data-sending firms in an 
industry, to validate the business plans of would-be receivers 
and to make sure that all certified receivers receive the appro-
priately anonymized user information of senders in a stand-
ardized, equitable and workable way. To reap economies of 
scope, it would also be tasked with market definition and the 
running of tests on the data-drivenness of all potential indus-
tries (see Section 3.1). 
Given this massive volume of important tasks, the organiza-
tion must be well equipped with resources, especially with 
experts from various domains (at least technological, legal 
and economic) and with appropriate powers to perform its 
tasks effectively. Moreover, the organization must have a le-
gitimate mandate to perform its tasks throughout the Euro-
pean Union. Therefore, it seems natural to locate it at EU lev-
el. It could be a new part of the EU’s DG Competition or an 
independent agency with appropriate resource endowments 
and powers.26 Moreover, the organization – let us call it the 
European Data Sharing Authority for now – should collabo-
rate with national authorities in member states, especially in 
cases in which markets, despite their internet- related charac-
ter, are largely local (for example, platforms for food delivery).
26  One legal scholar has expressed the following view: »I think in any 
case this needs to be run through a legislative process: either by adopting 
frameworks for specific sectors like PSD2 or by granting competition au-
thorities clearly defined new competences. Because they are executive 
bodies, competition authorities in my view lack the legitimacy to make 
such important policy choices on the basis of the current competition law 
framework.« 
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In line with rapid technological progress in the fields of data 
collection (creating big data sets) and data analytics (driven 
by machine learning), academic research in law and econom-
ics has started to recognize and analyse the problems stem-
ming from these developments over the past few years. Since 
Argenton and Prüfer (2012), the identification of market tip-
ping as a central consequence of datafication and the policy 
proposal of mandatory data sharing has gained more and 
more traction, both among researchers and, since 2016, 
among policy-makers. Moreover, all large and many smaller 
countries have commissioned expert reports on the econom-
ics of »platform markets«, »digital markets« and »big tech 
regulation«, and most of them have concluded that existing 
competition law has to be developed further to keep up with 
the challenges in such industries.27 Many include a provision 
that would allow competition authorities to mandate data 
sharing in specific industries, especially if the network effects 
driving industry dynamics are very strong.28
In the academic literature I am aware of, no other policy pro-
posal is as concrete as the mandatory data-sharing proposal 
to fight the ills of market tipping on data-driven markets. 
Therefore, in this article I have attempted to develop this pro-
posal further and to bring it closer to legal implementability 
by suggesting tentative answers to the key questions that 
have come up in many discussions with policy-makers, prac-
titioners and academics. 
As already explained, more research is needed. Most urgent 
is the development of an empirical test for data-drivenness at 
the industry level and the application of the test in the field 
(see Section 3.1). The second most pressing issue is to study 
the economic and corporate governance of data sharing in 
order to better understand how the proposal could be imple- 
27 Examples include the Vestager Report in the EU (Crémer et al., 2019), 
the Furman Report in the UK (Furman et al., 2019), the Stigler Committee 
on Digital Platforms in the US (Zingales et al., 2019) or the Bericht der 
Kommission Wettbewerbsrecht 4.0 (Schallbruch et al., 2019) in Germany. 
Beaton-Wells (2019:2) writes of the report by the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission »there have been just shy of 30 such inquiries 
on the same or related topics published or announced around the world 
in the last five years«.
28 For instance, the ”Dutch vision on data sharing between businesses“ 
(2019) or Soriano (2019), the Head of the French regulator ARCEP, go far in 
this direction.
mented in a way that gets the incentives of all involved par-
ties right (see Section 3.6). 
One important caveat concerning the proposal is that, even if 
mandatory data sharing was fully implemented in the EU, as 
outlined above, it is only a necessary, not a sufficient condi-
tion for lively competition and innovation on data-driven mar-
kets. Competing successfully with the most valuable and 
technologically advanced firms on the planet in the markets 
they have dominated for years, requires more than access to 
the raw data those firms collect by logging interactions with 
users. Would-be competitors will also depend on highly 
skilled and specialized workers, especially those who under-
stand today’s AI algorithms, and first-class access to assets 
such as infrastructure, software and hardware.29 After data 
sharing is implemented, in these complementary dimensions, 
which are beyond the control of most single firms, policy- 
makers may play a role. 
Even if this may appear to be a Herculean task, all efforts 
would be certainly lost without access to dominant firms’ us-
er information. Only if entrepreneurs and other would-be 
competitors can benefit from free access to information 
about users’ preferences and characteristics, which is essen-
tial in data-driven markets, will it be worth it for them to de-
velop new products, services and quality improvements and 
for financial investors to fund their ventures. The sheer pros-
pect of such competition, in turn, will motivate the dominant 
firms to fight for their turf and to innovate harder themselves. 
The result will be that users benefit from more choice, both 
between and within providers, from higher product and ser-
vice quality, and lower prices. Dominant firms will have less 
market power, which at present gives them sufficient leeway 
to engage in anticompetitive conduct (whether or not they 
use this leeway). Finally, among emerging competitors a uni-
corn may come to the fore that gets its chance to flourish by 
means of access to user information today, which would oth-
erwise have perished.
29 In many data-driven markets, the nominal price to use the services of 
a provider are zero. However, often the economic price paid is expressed 
in a different currency such as one’s attention, personal data, or the agree-
ment to terms & conditions one might have rejected otherwise. See the 
recent Facebook case at Germany’s Bundeskartellamt. Dengler and Prüfer 
(2018) show how the option to escape personalized prices through using 
an anonymous sales channel can lead to net benefits for some but to 
losses for other users.
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Competition Policy and Data sharing on Data-driven Markets.
Steps Towards Legal Implementation.
The big tech companies continue to grow and increasingly dominate the commercial internet. Over 90 
per cent of internet searches go through Google; in social media Facebook’s European market share is 
over 70 per cent; and almost half of Germany’s online commerce now takes place via Amazon. This ten-
dency towards the monopolisation of data-driven markets not only endangers competition, but weakens 
business’s innovative capacity.
Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic are now looking at what can be done to counteract this at the 
political level. Most proposals rely on traditional competition-law instruments. The present study, by con-
trast, makes a far-reaching recommendation. The basic assumption is that the massive accumulation of 
data in data-driven markets and the denial of access to it represent the main causes of increasing mo-
nopolisation. The decisive measure to break through the tech monopoly, then, would be to open up 
data to competitors. Only an obligation to share data (in conformity with data protection) could ensure 
competition and innovation in data-driven markets, according to the author. 
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